| 大会名称 |
| 2016年 総合大会 |
| 大会コ－ド |
| 2016G |
| 開催年 |
|
2016
|
| 発行日 |
|
2016/3/1
|
| セッション番号 |
|
BS-3
|
| セッション名 |
|
Advanced Networking Technologies for Innovative Information Networks
|
| 講演日 |
|
2016/3/16
|
| 講演場所(会議室等) |
|
センター2号館 2F 2212
|
| 講演番号 |
|
BS-3-13
|
| タイトル |
|
Analyzing the Traffic Correlation-Based Attacks on Tor
|
| 著者名 |
|
○Timothy Girry Kale, Satoshi Ohzahata, Celimuge Wu, Toshihiko Kato,
|
| キーワード |
|
Tor, Overlay Network, Security, Onion Routing, Onion Proxies, Client
|
| 抄録 |
|
In this paper, we performed the traffic correlation-based attacks on Tor by deploying attacker ORs, which are used to capture the traffic correlation as it enters and exits the Tor network. Our goal is to present a simple and realistic adversary methods of attacks by changing the route of client traffics to attacker ORs. In particular, we considered the metrics of attacker resources such as bandwidths and exit port policies, which adversary can used to perform any attacks on Tor. The objectives of this study is to analyze the security problems in the current Tor network and in the future, we can explore more on the better approach solution to prevent some of these routing traffic based attacks on Tor.
|
| 本文pdf |
|
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|
