Summary
2021
Session Number:TS1
Session:
Number:TS1-2
Friendly Jamming in Wireless Networks: A Stackelberg Game
Shilpa Rao, Rohit Tripathi,
pp.67-72
Publication Date:2021/9/8
Online ISSN:2188-5079
Summary:
Wireless networks are vulnerable to security issues such eavesdropping, unauthorized access, and malicious data injections. To ensure network security for resource constrained wireless systems such sensor networks and internet of things (IoT), trusted devices called friendly jammers are deployed. In this paper, we consider a wireless system consisting of two friendly jammers and one malicious user, where the jammers attempt to prevent the malicious user from accessing the network. We formulate the interaction between the jammers and the malicious user in the form of a Stackelberg game in which one of the jammers announces its strategy first. Thereafter, the other jammer and the malicious user choose their strategies, accordingly. We derive the Nash equilibrium strategies of the jammers and the malicious user and illustrate the effect of the transmission and jamming cost on the optimal strategy. Further, we observe that the total profit of jammers in the Stackelberg case is higher than that in the non-cooperative game between the jammers.