Summary

International Symposium on Nonlinear Theory and its Applications

2008

Session Number:C2L-B

Session:

Number:C2L-B5

Evolutionary Game Model of Water Resource Development Problem

Ryuzaburo TAKEDA,  Takafumi KANAZAWA,  Toshimitsu USHIO,  

pp.-

Publication Date:2008/9/7

Online ISSN:2188-5079

DOI:10.34385/proc.42.C2L-B5

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Summary:
There are many kinds of conflict in the world, and they are very complex and controversial. To analyze conflicts, the methodology of games can be employed. In this paper, we model a negotiation process between prefectures over water resource development by the evolutionary game theory. We consider the upstream prefecture consists of two sections. We propose a model that they play games with the downstream prefecture and change their strategies depending not only on their own payoffs but also on total payoffs of the upstream prefecture.