Summary
International Symposium on Nonlinear Theory and its Applications
2017
Session Number:A1L-C
Session:
Number:A1L-C-1
Meta-Sanctions Game on Complex Networks
Fujio Toriumi, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isam Okada,
pp.34-37
Publication Date:2017/12/4
Online ISSN:2188-5079
Summary:
Although incentive systems are effective for resolving social dilemmas, most studies consider interactions with no structures. This unnatural assumption is worth to loosen for dealing with real situations. Groupware, for example, is an effective form of media for knowledge sharing and active open communication. How should groupware in which vast amounts of beneficial content are provided and active discussion is designed? The behavior of information in such a medium resembles social dilemma games because users voluntarily post beneficial information that creates media values. Here, we show the evolution of cooperation in social dilemma games with incentive systems on networks. Our results reveal that spatial structures tend to prevent from promoting cooperative regimes and that a scale-free network can promote the cooperation while even a complex network cannot in specific parameters.