Summary
International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility
2009
Session Number:21P1
Session:
Number:21P1-5
An Analysis of Information Leakage from a Cryptographic Hardware via Common-Mode Current
Y. Hayashi, T. Sugawara, Y. Kayano, N. Homma, T. Mizuki, A. Satoh, T. Aoki, S. Minegishi,
pp.17-20
Publication Date:2009/7/20
Online ISSN:2188-5079
DOI:10.34385/proc.14.21P1-5
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Summary:
This paper analyzes the propagation of information leaked from cryptographic modules via common-mode current. We propose a simple board model in order to discuss the leakage mechanism in a general manner. Our simulation and experimental results show that the frequency characteristic of the proposed board model agrees rather well with those of a real cryptographic board. Based on these results, we propose that there needs to be a discussion on security countermeasures from the view of both EMC and side channel attack.