Summary

International Symposium on Electromagnetic Compatibility

2009

Session Number:21P1

Session:

Number:21P1-5

An Analysis of Information Leakage from a Cryptographic Hardware via Common-Mode Current

Y. Hayashi,  T. Sugawara,  Y. Kayano,  N. Homma,  T. Mizuki,  A. Satoh,  T. Aoki,  S. Minegishi,  

pp.17-20

Publication Date:2009/7/20

Online ISSN:2188-5079

DOI:10.34385/proc.14.21P1-5

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Summary:
This paper analyzes the propagation of information leaked from cryptographic modules via common-mode current. We propose a simple board model in order to discuss the leakage mechanism in a general manner. Our simulation and experimental results show that the frequency characteristic of the proposed board model agrees rather well with those of a real cryptographic board. Based on these results, we propose that there needs to be a discussion on security countermeasures from the view of both EMC and side channel attack.