Summary
International Symposium on Nonlinear Theory and its Applications
2009
Session Number:B1L-D
Session:
Number:B1L-D3
Multipopulation Replicator Dynamics with Capitation Tax and Subsidy
Tadasuke ICHIBA, Takafumi KANAZAWA, Toshimitsu USHIO,
pp.-
Publication Date:2009/10/18
Online ISSN:2188-5079
DOI:10.34385/proc.43.B1L-D3
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Summary:
In population consists of many selfish players, the purpose of each player often conflicts with the total purpose of the population. In order to govern the population, the ”government” imposes a capitation tax and offers a subsidy. To describe dynamical evolutions of a population state which is a distribution of strategies in such a population, replicator dynamics with a capitation tax and a subsidy has been proposed. The model deals with interactions of players in a single population. However, some social or biological systems consists of multiple populations. In such a situation, games are played between two players who belong to not only the same population but different populations. In this paper, we extend the model to describe changes of multiple populations’ states.