Presentation 2014-10-23
Effect of Precisely Timed Intentional Electromagnetic Interference on Internal Operation in Cryptographic Device
Mizuki KOBAYASHI, Yu-ichi HAYASHI, Naofumi HOMMA, Takaaki MIZUKI, Takafumi AOKI, Hideaki SONE,
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Abstract(in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Abstract(in English) This paper presents a new intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) fault-injection method that can inject transient faults timely at a distance from cryptographic operations. Such IEMI fault injection could pose severe threats to many cryptographic devices assumed that attackers cannot access them directly since it can be used for performing fault analysis. The proposed IEMI fault-injection method injects a block (i.e., period) of continuous sinusoidal waves via cables attached to cryptographic devices instead of immediate electromagnetic pulse used in the conventional methods. The injected EM waves have a temporary impact in the cryptographic module, but not in other components on the device. Another important feature of the proposed method is to employ EM information leaked from the cryptographic operations for the trigger signal of the fault injection. In this paper, we demonstrate that the proposed method can inject faults timely into the final round of an AES hardware through an experiment.
Keyword(in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Keyword(in English) Intentional Electromagnetic Interference / Common-mode Current / Side-channel Analysis / Fault-injection Attack
Paper # EMCJ2014-46,MW2014-102,EST2014-60
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Committee MW
Conference Date 2014/10/16(1days)
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Paper Information
Registration To Microwaves (MW)
Language JPN
Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Sub Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Title (in English) Effect of Precisely Timed Intentional Electromagnetic Interference on Internal Operation in Cryptographic Device
Sub Title (in English)
Keyword(1) Intentional Electromagnetic Interference
Keyword(2) Common-mode Current
Keyword(3) Side-channel Analysis
Keyword(4) Fault-injection Attack
1st Author's Name Mizuki KOBAYASHI
1st Author's Affiliation Tohoku University()
2nd Author's Name Yu-ichi HAYASHI
2nd Author's Affiliation Tohoku University
3rd Author's Name Naofumi HOMMA
3rd Author's Affiliation Tohoku University
4th Author's Name Takaaki MIZUKI
4th Author's Affiliation Tohoku University
5th Author's Name Takafumi AOKI
5th Author's Affiliation Tohoku University
6th Author's Name Hideaki SONE
6th Author's Affiliation Tohoku University
Date 2014-10-23
Paper # EMCJ2014-46,MW2014-102,EST2014-60
Volume (vol) vol.114
Number (no) 267
Page pp.pp.-
#Pages 5
Date of Issue