Presentation 2010-10-15
Secure Vickrey Auction Based on Secret Sharing
Takuma SUGIMOTO, Takashi HORIYAMA,
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Abstract(in English) Vickrey auction, in which the highest bidder wins at the second highest price, is a well-known incentive compatible auction. For achieving the privacy of bidders, we can run the auction without revealing the bidding prices to bidders, while it allows the auctioneer to cheat the second highest bidding price. In this paper, we propose making use of the techniques of secret sharing, and design an information-theoretically secure protocol that prohibits auctioneers from cheating the bidders, and that does not leak any additional information against the set of size t
Keyword(in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Keyword(in English) Vickrey Auction / Secret Sharing / Integer Division
Paper # COMP2010-34
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Conference Information
Committee COMP
Conference Date 2010/10/8(1days)
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Paper Information
Registration To Theoretical Foundations of Computing (COMP)
Language JPN
Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Sub Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Title (in English) Secure Vickrey Auction Based on Secret Sharing
Sub Title (in English)
Keyword(1) Vickrey Auction
Keyword(2) Secret Sharing
Keyword(3) Integer Division
1st Author's Name Takuma SUGIMOTO
1st Author's Affiliation Graduate School of Science and Engineering, Saitama University()
2nd Author's Name Takashi HORIYAMA
2nd Author's Affiliation Graduate School of Science and Engineering, Saitama University
Date 2010-10-15
Paper # COMP2010-34
Volume (vol) vol.110
Number (no) 232
Page pp.pp.-
#Pages 7
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