Presentation 2010-01-22
Designing a Two-sided Matching Protocol under Asymmetric Information
Masanori HATANAKA, Shigeo MATSUBARA,
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Abstract(in English) We consider two-sided matching situations on the information network such as employers and job applicants in labor market. In these cases, applicants are differently informed and well informed applicants may intentionally hide its information to obtain more desirable matching. To solve this problem, we propose a new two-sided matching protocol in which applicants are allowed to report their conditional preferences and well informed applicants motivate to disclose and share information among applicants. The experimental results show that the proposed protocol rarely gives a lower utility to information providers, i.e., information providers are motivated to disclose their information, although the protocol does not satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint in disclosing information. In addition, our protocol can attain more satisfactory matching in terms of stability and efficiency.
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Keyword(in English) two-sided matching / mechanism design / game theory
Paper # AI2009-28
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Committee AI
Conference Date 2010/1/15(1days)
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Registration To Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge-Based Processing (AI)
Language JPN
Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Sub Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Title (in English) Designing a Two-sided Matching Protocol under Asymmetric Information
Sub Title (in English)
Keyword(1) two-sided matching
Keyword(2) mechanism design
Keyword(3) game theory
1st Author's Name Masanori HATANAKA
1st Author's Affiliation Department of Informatics, Kyoto University()
2nd Author's Name Shigeo MATSUBARA
2nd Author's Affiliation Department of Informatics, Kyoto University
Date 2010-01-22
Paper # AI2009-28
Volume (vol) vol.109
Number (no) 386
Page pp.pp.-
#Pages 6
Date of Issue