Presentation	2008/8/19 Communicating Honest Apologetic Intention by Costly Signaling Yohsuke OHTSUBO, Esuka WATANABE,
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Abstract(in English)	Based on a signaling game model, we predicted that people will perceive costly apologies more sincere than no cost apologies. To test this prediction, we conducted a series of vignette and laboratory experiments. In vignette experiments, participants were asked to imagine that their friend committed a personal transgression to them, and made either a costly or no cost apology to them. In the laboratory experiment, an experimental confederate made an unfair allocation of a certain amount of money between him/her and participants, and made either a costly or no cost apology. In these experiments, participants found costly apologies sincerer than no cost apologies.
Keyword(in Japanese)	(See Japanese page)
Keyword(in English)	Costly Signaling / Apology / Mind-reading
Paper #	HCS2008-37
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Conference Information
Committee	HCS
Conference Date	2008/8/19(1days)
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Paper Information
Registration To	Human Communication Science (HCS)
Language	JPN
Title (in Japanese)	(See Japanese page)
Sub Title (in Japanese)	(See Japanese page)
Title (in English)	Communicating Honest Apologetic Intention by Costly Signaling
Sub Title (in English)
Keyword(1)	Costly Signaling
Keyword(2)	Apology
Keyword(3)	Mind-reading
1st Author's Name	Yohsuke OHTSUBO
1st Author's Affiliation	Faculty of Letters, Kobe University()
2nd Author's Name	Esuka WATANABE
2nd Author's Affiliation	Faculty of Letters, Kobe University
Date	2008/8/19
Paper #	HCS2008-37
Volume (vol)	vol.108
Number (no)	187
Page	pp.pp.-
#Pages	5
Date of Issue