Presentation | 2007-03-15 Fault Attack on RSA using INSTAC-32 compliant platform Koichi Fujisaki, Hideo Shimizu, |
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PDF Download Page | PDF download Page Link |
Abstract(in Japanese) | (See Japanese page) |
Abstract(in English) | There are fault injection attacks, which use results of malfunction of cryptographic operation, for acryptographic module. While many fault injection attacks were proposed, A. Lenstra proposed the attack technique with few restrictions. This attack technique is effective to RSA which used the China remainder theorem. If malfunction can be caused at the time of operation, it can derive secret information. We experimented using the platform for standard evaluation which has 32bit CPU, and succeeded this attack technique. This paper is the report about this experiment result. |
Keyword(in Japanese) | (See Japanese page) |
Keyword(in English) | INSTAC-32 compliant platform / fault attack / RSA |
Paper # | IT2006-71,ISEC2006-126,WBS2006-68 |
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Conference Information | |
Committee | ISEC |
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Conference Date | 2007/3/8(1days) |
Place (in Japanese) | (See Japanese page) |
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Topics (in Japanese) | (See Japanese page) |
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Paper Information | |
Registration To | Information Security (ISEC) |
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Language | JPN |
Title (in Japanese) | (See Japanese page) |
Sub Title (in Japanese) | (See Japanese page) |
Title (in English) | Fault Attack on RSA using INSTAC-32 compliant platform |
Sub Title (in English) | |
Keyword(1) | INSTAC-32 compliant platform |
Keyword(2) | fault attack |
Keyword(3) | RSA |
1st Author's Name | Koichi Fujisaki |
1st Author's Affiliation | Toshiba, Corporate Research & Development Center() |
2nd Author's Name | Hideo Shimizu |
2nd Author's Affiliation | Toshiba, Corporate Research & Development Center |
Date | 2007-03-15 |
Paper # | IT2006-71,ISEC2006-126,WBS2006-68 |
Volume (vol) | vol.106 |
Number (no) | 596 |
Page | pp.pp.- |
#Pages | 5 |
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