Presentation 2005/3/8
Designing an auction protocol for cases including insincere sellers motivating buyers to investigate unidentified sellers
Masafumi MATSUDA, Shigeo MATSUBARA,
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Abstract(in English) To achieve a socially efficient allocation in Internet auctions, it is important to exclude insincere sellers, i.e., it is necessary to investigate unidentified sellers and share information on them. However, the first buyer (investigator) may suffer a loss if the seller is insincere, which discourages the buyer being an investigator. To solve this problem, we design auction protocols that motivate buyers to investigate unidentified sellers by determining an appropriate amount of payment. We prove that the buyers' truth telling is in equilibrium in this protocol. Moreover, experimental results show that the social surplus obtained by our protocol is close to an efficient allocation.
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Keyword(in English) mechanism designe / auction protocol / reputation / electronic commerce
Paper # AI2004-85
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Committee AI
Conference Date 2005/3/8(1days)
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Registration To Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge-Based Processing (AI)
Language JPN
Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Sub Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Title (in English) Designing an auction protocol for cases including insincere sellers motivating buyers to investigate unidentified sellers
Sub Title (in English)
Keyword(1) mechanism designe
Keyword(2) auction protocol
Keyword(3) reputation
Keyword(4) electronic commerce
1st Author's Name Masafumi MATSUDA
1st Author's Affiliation NTT Communication Science Laboratories()
2nd Author's Name Shigeo MATSUBARA
2nd Author's Affiliation NTT Communication Science Laboratories
Date 2005/3/8
Paper # AI2004-85
Volume (vol) vol.104
Number (no) 727
Page pp.pp.-
#Pages 6
Date of Issue