| 講演名 | 2017-05-13 λ Group Strategy Proof Mechanisms for the Obnoxious Facility Game in Star Networks 福井 悠平(京大), アレクサンダル シュルベフスキ(京大), 永持 仁(京大), |
|---|---|
| PDFダウンロードページ |  PDFダウンロードページへ |
| 抄録(和) | In the obnoxious facility game, we design mechanisms that output a location of an undesirable facility based on the locations of players reported by themselves. The benefit of a player is defined to be the distance between her location and the facility. A player may try to manipulate the output of the mechanism by strategically misreporting her location. We wish to design a $lambda$-group strategy-proof mechanism i.e., for every group of players, at least one player in the group cannot gain strictly more than $lambda$ times her primary benefit by having the entire group change their reports simultaneously. In this paper, we design an $k$-candidate $lambda$-group strategy-proof mechanism for the obnoxious facility game in the metric defined by $k$ half lines with a common endpoint such that each candidate is a point in each of the half-lines at the same distance to the common endpoint as other candidates. Then, we show that the benefit ratio of the mechanism is at most $1+1/(k-1)lambda$. Finally, we prove that the bound is nearly tight. |
| 抄録(英) | In the obnoxious facility game, we design mechanisms that output a location of an undesirable facility based on the locations of players reported by themselves. The benefit of a player is defined to be the distance between her location and the facility. A player may try to manipulate the output of the mechanism by strategically misreporting her location. We wish to design a $lambda$-group strategy-proof mechanism i.e., for every group of players, at least one player in the group cannot gain strictly more than $lambda$ times her primary benefit by having the entire group change their reports simultaneously. In this paper, we design an $k$-candidate $lambda$-group strategy-proof mechanism for the obnoxious facility game in the metric defined by $k$ half lines with a common endpoint such that each candidate is a point in each of the half-lines at the same distance to the common endpoint as other candidates. Then, we show that the benefit ratio of the mechanism is at most $1+1/(k-1)lambda$. Finally, we prove that the bound is nearly tight. |
| キーワード(和) | |
| キーワード(英) | mechanism designobnoxious facility gamestrategy proofstar network |
| 資料番号 | COMP2017-9 |
| 発行日 | 2017-05-05 (COMP) |
| 研究会情報 | |
| 研究会 | COMP / IPSJ-AL |
|---|---|
| 開催期間 | 2017/5/12(から2日開催) |
| 開催地（和） | 長崎県建設工業協同組合 |
| 開催地（英） | |
| テーマ（和） | |
| テーマ（英） | |
| 委員長氏名（和） | 伊藤 大雄(電通大) / 堀山 貴史(埼玉大) |
| 委員長氏名（英） | Hiro Ito(Univ. of Electro-Comm.) / 堀山 貴史(埼玉大) |
| 副委員長氏名（和） | 宇野 裕之(阪府大) |
| 副委員長氏名（英） | Yushi Uno(Osaka Pref. Univ.) |
| 幹事氏名（和） | 脊戸 和寿(成蹊大) / 斎藤 寿樹(九工大) / 岡本 吉央(電通大) / 川原 純(NAIST) / 河村 彰星(東大) |
| 幹事氏名（英） | Kazuhisa Seto(Seikei Univ.) / Toshiki Saito(Kyushu Inst. of Tech.) / 岡本 吉央(電通大) / 川原 純(NAIST) / 河村 彰星(東大) |
| 幹事補佐氏名（和） | |
| 幹事補佐氏名（英） | |
| 講演論文情報詳細 | |
| 申込み研究会 | Technical Committee on Theoretical Foundations of Computing / Special Interest Group on Algorithms |
|---|---|
| 本文の言語 | ENG |
| タイトル（和） | |
| サブタイトル（和） | |
| タイトル（英） | λ Group Strategy Proof Mechanisms for the Obnoxious Facility Game in Star Networks |
| サブタイトル（和） | |
| キーワード(1)（和/英） | / mechanism designobnoxious facility gamestrategy proofstar network |
| 第 1 著者 氏名（和/英） | 福井 悠平 / Yuhei Fukui |
| 第 1 著者 所属（和/英） | 京都大学(略称：京大) Kyoto University(略称：Kyoto Univ.) |
| 第 2 著者 氏名（和/英） | アレクサンダル シュルベフスキ / Aleksandar Shurbevski |
| 第 2 著者 所属（和/英） | 京都大学(略称：京大) Kyoto University(略称：Kyoto Univ.) |
| 第 3 著者 氏名（和/英） | 永持 仁 / Hiroshi Nagamochi |
| 第 3 著者 所属（和/英） | 京都大学(略称：京大) Kyoto University(略称：Kyoto Univ.) |
| 発表年月日 | 2017-05-13 |
| 資料番号 | COMP2017-9 |
| 巻番号（vol） | vol.117 |
| 号番号（no） | COMP-28 |
| ページ範囲 | pp.61-68(COMP), |
| ページ数 | 8 |
| 発行日 | 2017-05-05 (COMP) |