Presentation 2022-03-08
Evaluation of Side-channel Leaks Specific to Unrolled AES Hardware
Ayano Nakashima, Rei Ueno, Naofumi Homma,
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Abstract(in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Abstract(in English) This paper presents the evaluation of a unique side-channel leakage occurred from the middle roundsof (pipelined) unrolled AES hardware. A full-round countermeasure is ideal for an unrolled implementation ofblock ciphers. However, for reducing the large hardware overhead, only the vulnerable rounds should be protected. Generally, the first and last rounds are vulnerable to side-channel attacks, and should be protected . In addition, recently the first few rounds could also be attacked with the same amount of computation as the first round. This isbecause the side channel leakage depending on the result of the first round occurs from the following rounds wherethe input diffusion is not sufficient. This leakage is unique to unrolled implementation. In this paper we evaluatethe presence or absence of such a unique leakage from the middle rounds of unrolled AES hardware by CPA. Inparticular, we propose a new power model to estimate the middle round leakage more accurately from the AESfirst round intermediate values. The conventional model employs the Hamming Distance (HD) value correspondingto the amount of the first round switching in order to perform CPAs with the middle round power consumption. But we found that this was not applicable to the diffusion characteristics of AES. The proposed model classifies theintermediate values directly by the difference value by an XOR operation in stead of the HD value, and considers theestimated power value as the HD value given by the key-averaged pre-computation. We demonstrate through CPAswith the proposed model that a unique side-channel leakage occurs even from the first several rounds of unrolledAES hardware.
Keyword(in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Keyword(in English) Side-channel attacks / Block cipher / Unrolled implementation / AES / Differential power analysis
Paper # VLD2021-100,HWS2021-77
Date of Issue 2022-02-28 (VLD, HWS)

Conference Information
Committee VLD / HWS
Conference Date 2022/3/7(2days)
Place (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Place (in English) Online
Topics (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Topics (in English) Design Technology for System-on-Silicon, Hardware Security, etc.
Chair Kazutoshi Kobayashi(Kyoto Inst. of Tech.) / Yasuhisa Shimazaki(Renesas Electronics)
Vice Chair Minako Ikeda(NTT) / Makoto Nagata(Kobe Univ.) / Daisuke Suzuki(Mitsubishi Electric)
Secretary Minako Ikeda(Osaka Univ.) / Makoto Nagata(NEC) / Daisuke Suzuki(NTT)
Assistant

Paper Information
Registration To Technical Committee on VLSI Design Technologies / Technical Committee on Hardware Security
Language JPN
Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Sub Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page)
Title (in English) Evaluation of Side-channel Leaks Specific to Unrolled AES Hardware
Sub Title (in English)
Keyword(1) Side-channel attacks
Keyword(2) Block cipher
Keyword(3) Unrolled implementation
Keyword(4) AES
Keyword(5) Differential power analysis
1st Author's Name Ayano Nakashima
1st Author's Affiliation Tohoku University(Tohoku Univ.)
2nd Author's Name Rei Ueno
2nd Author's Affiliation Tohoku University(Tohoku Univ.)
3rd Author's Name Naofumi Homma
3rd Author's Affiliation Tohoku University(Tohoku Univ.)
Date 2022-03-08
Paper # VLD2021-100,HWS2021-77
Volume (vol) vol.121
Number (no) VLD-412,HWS-413
Page pp.pp.135-140(VLD), pp.135-140(HWS),
#Pages 6
Date of Issue 2022-02-28 (VLD, HWS)