| 大会名称 |
|---|
| 2016年 ソサイエティ大会 |
| 大会コ－ド |
| 2016S |
| 開催年 |
| 2016 |
| 発行日 |
| 2016-09-06 |
| セッション番号 |
| BS-5 |
| セッション名 |
| Network and Service Design, Control and Management |
| 講演日 |
| 2016/9/22 |
| 講演場所(会議室等) |
| 工学部 M棟 M151 |
| 講演番号 |
| BS-5-23 |
| タイトル |
| A Basic Evaluation of Active Timing Correlation Attacks on Tor |
| 著者名 |
| ○Timothy Girry Kale, Satoshi Ohzahata, Celimuge Wu, Toshihiko Kato, |
| キーワード |
| Tor, Onion Router, Onion Proxy, Anonymity, Correlation, Attacks |
| 抄録 |
|
Tor Network is a low-latency anonymity and censorship resistance network, which transfer client traffics through series of random onion routers (ORs) before being forwarded to the destination. Tor is known to be insecure against an adversary that can observe a user’s traffic entering and exiting the Tor anonymity network. In this paper, we performed an active timing correlation attacks on Tor by deploying the attacker (malicious) ORs, which are used to capture and analyze the traffic correlation as it enters and exits the Tor network. Our goal is to present simple methods of attacking Tor clients by altering the route of client traffic to malicious ORs, without the client knowledge. We showed that any knowledgeable attackers could easily attack Tor by correlating the Tor traffics and correctly identify the traffic patterns. |
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