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Paper Abstract and Keywords
Presentation 2018-11-22 11:30
[Invited Talk] Security Simulation of Cryptographic Module in Side-Channel Attack
Kengo Iokibe, Yoshitaka Toyota (Okayama Univ.) EMCJ2018-61
Abstract (in Japanese) (See Japanese page) 
(in English) Side-channel attacks (SCAs) are one of the biggest threats to cryptography and one of important issues in IoT modules, closely related to the EMC field. If IoT modules are vulnerable to SCAs, cryptographic algorithms implemented in the module are no longer secure even when the algorithms are ensured mathematically secure. In an SCA, adversaries exploit unintentional noises of an integrated circuit (IC) on which the target cryptographic algorithm is implemented, such as electromagnetic emanation, voltage bounce in the power distribution network for the IC, and common-mode current and/or radiation. Those noises are caused by the dynamic switching current of the CMOS digital circuit that processes the target cryptographic operation and the intensity of the noise depends on processed data. SCAs can be realized if the data dependency of noise is detectable. For simulating security against SCAs on an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) circuit, an equivalent circuit model of cryptographic IC was developed to estimate the data dependency in the power voltage bounce. The equivalent circuit model was confirmed that it produced a precise waveform simulation of power voltage bounce depending of data. As analyzing the data dependency of the simulated waveform, security of the AES circuit against SCA was also estimated in excellent accuracy. These results proved that the current source, a component of the equivalent circuit model, expresses the strength of side-channel information leakage of a cryptographic circuit. In our previous work, the equivalent circuit was modeled from measurements with a prototype of cryptographic module. In addition, we are studying for establishing a method to extract the current source from simulation based on a design information of cryptographic circuits. A preliminary result has been obtained suggesting that the current source can be extracted accurately from a power consumption simulation based on design information by using an EDA tool from IC venders.
Keyword (in Japanese) (See Japanese page) 
(in English) Side-channel attack / Equivalent circuit model / Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) / Correlation power analysis / / / /  
Reference Info. IEICE Tech. Rep., vol. 118, no. 317, EMCJ2018-61, pp. 19-19, Nov. 2018.
Paper # EMCJ2018-61 
Date of Issue 2018-11-15 (EMCJ) 
ISSN Print edition: ISSN 0913-5685  Online edition: ISSN 2432-6380
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All rights are reserved and no part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Notwithstanding, instructors are permitted to photocopy isolated articles for noncommercial classroom use without fee. (License No.: 10GA0019/12GB0052/13GB0056/17GB0034/18GB0034)
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Conference Information
Committee EMCJ IEE-EMC IEE-MAG  
Conference Date 2018-11-22 - 2018-11-23 
Place (in Japanese) (See Japanese page) 
Place (in English) KAIST 
Topics (in Japanese) (See Japanese page) 
Topics (in English) EMC Joint Workshop 2018, Daejon 
Paper Information
Registration To EMCJ 
Conference Code 2018-11-EMCJ-EMC-MAG 
Language English 
Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page) 
Sub Title (in Japanese) (See Japanese page) 
Title (in English) Security Simulation of Cryptographic Module in Side-Channel Attack 
Sub Title (in English)  
Keyword(1) Side-channel attack  
Keyword(2) Equivalent circuit model  
Keyword(3) Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)  
Keyword(4) Correlation power analysis  
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1st Author's Name Kengo Iokibe  
1st Author's Affiliation Okayama University (Okayama Univ.)
2nd Author's Name Yoshitaka Toyota  
2nd Author's Affiliation Okayama University (Okayama Univ.)
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Speaker
Date Time 2018-11-22 11:30:00 
Presentation Time 40 
Registration for EMCJ 
Paper # IEICE-EMCJ2018-61 
Volume (vol) IEICE-118 
Number (no) no.317 
Page p.19 
#Pages IEICE-1 
Date of Issue IEICE-EMCJ-2018-11-15 


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