講演抄録/キーワード |
講演名 |
2013-11-22 14:55
Stochastic Resonance and The Secrecy Capacity of Wiretap Channels ○Oussama Souihli(KDDI R&D Labs)・Tomoaki Ohtsuki(Keio Univ.) RCS2013-204 |
抄録 |
(和) |
Traditionally, physical-layer security is achieved by providing the legitimate receiver a physical-layer advantage over the eavesdropper or, equivalently, by making the eavesdropper's channel more degraded than the legitimate user's, in what is known as the degraded wiretap channel. Such physical-layer advantages can, however, be somewhat easily leveraged by the eavesdropper as the latter may, for instance, degrade the eavesdropper's channel through e.g. a jamming signal applied to the legitimate receiver's channel. To our knowledge, there are no works in the literature that have achieved physical-layer security over a channel where the eavesdropper has the physical-layer advantage over the legitimate user. Thus, we take aim in this work at achieving secrecy in such scenario where the eavesdropper's signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is better than the legitimate receiver's, a scenario that we call the reversely-degraded wiretap channel. Precisely, we show that by constraining the transmitter's input to be discrete uniform distributed (such as an on-off keying modulation) and by using nonlinear threshold-based detection, the legitimate receiver is guaranteed to have a positive secrecy capacity even though the eavesdropper has a better receive SNR. The former requirement on the input distribution is to limit the capacity gains of the eavesdropper at high SNR. The latter requirement allows the communication channel to exhibit supra-threshold stochastic resonance, a phenomenon whereby noise increases the legitimate receiver's mutual information (and, in turn, the secrecy capacity). A numerical example is provided to confirm the above claims. |
(英) |
Traditionally, physical-layer security is achieved by providing the legitimate receiver a physical-layer advantage over the eavesdropper or, equivalently, by making the eavesdropper's channel more degraded than the legitimate user's, in what is known as the degraded wiretap channel. Such physical-layer advantages can, however, be somewhat easily leveraged by the eavesdropper as the latter may, for instance, degrade the eavesdropper's channel through e.g. a jamming signal applied to the legitimate receiver's channel. To our knowledge, there are no works in the literature that have achieved physical-layer security over a channel where the eavesdropper has the physical-layer advantage over the legitimate user. Thus, we take aim in this work at achieving secrecy in such scenario where the eavesdropper's signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is better than the legitimate receiver's, a scenario that we call the reversely-degraded wiretap channel. Precisely, we show that by constraining the transmitter's input to be discrete uniform distributed (such as an on-off keying modulation) and by using nonlinear threshold-based detection, the legitimate receiver is guaranteed to have a positive secrecy capacity even though the eavesdropper has a better receive SNR. The former requirement on the input distribution is to limit the capacity gains of the eavesdropper at high SNR. The latter requirement allows the communication channel to exhibit supra-threshold stochastic resonance, a phenomenon whereby noise increases the legitimate receiver's mutual information (and, in turn, the secrecy capacity). A numerical example is provided to confirm the above claims. |
キーワード |
(和) |
Information Security / Physical-Layer Security / Low SNR Communications / Stochastic Resonance / Information Theory / Wiretap Channel / / |
(英) |
Information Security / Physical-Layer Security / Low SNR Communications / Stochastic Resonance / Information Theory / Wiretap Channel / / |
文献情報 |
信学技報, vol. 113, no. 301, RCS2013-204, pp. 177-182, 2013年11月. |
資料番号 |
RCS2013-204 |
発行日 |
2013-11-13 (RCS) |
ISSN |
Print edition: ISSN 0913-5685 Online edition: ISSN 2432-6380 |
著作権に ついて |
技術研究報告に掲載された論文の著作権は電子情報通信学会に帰属します.(許諾番号:10GA0019/12GB0052/13GB0056/17GB0034/18GB0034) |
PDFダウンロード |
RCS2013-204 |
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