
情報理論的暗号の最近の発展と未解決問題

IT研究会@泉慶 November, 2017 渡辺 峻(東京農工大)

joint work with Himanshu Tyagi (IISc Bangalore)

Secret Key Cryptography












Shannon's Pessimistic Result

A secret key crypto system is secure only if

$H(K) \ge H(M)$

Key length must be as large as message length...

Wyner's Wiretap Channel



 $W(y,z|x) = W_1(y|x)W_2(z|y)$: Degraded Wiretap Channel [Wyner 75]

General wiretap channel [Csiszár-Körner]

Secret Key Agreement: Model

Eve


Z

[Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93]

Alice X $\frac{\mathsf{Bob}}{Y}$


Secret Key Agreement: Protocol

[Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93]



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
[Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93]




 $K_1 = K_1(X, \Pi)$

 $K_2 = K_2(Y, \Pi)$

Example 1: Maurer's Satellite Model




Example 2: Fading of Wireless Communication



[Hassan et. al. '96]

Example 3: Fuzzy Extractor (Biometric Security)



[Dodis et. al. 04]

Problem Formulation of SK

The generate key is
$$(arepsilon,\delta)$$
 -SK $(0\leqarepsilon,\delta<1)$ if there exists K such that

Reliability $\Pr\{K_1 = K_2 = K\} \ge 1 - \varepsilon$

Security $d(P_{K\Pi Z}, P_{\texttt{unif}} \times P_{\Pi Z}) \leq \delta$

$$\begin{split} d(P,Q) &:= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{a} |P(a) - Q(a)| \qquad P_{\Pi Z} : \text{marginal of } P_{K \Pi Z} \\ P_{\text{unif}}(k) &= \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}|} \end{split}$$

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 $S_{\varepsilon,\delta}(X,Y|Z)$:maximum $\log |\mathcal{K}|$ such that a protocol generating (ε,δ) -SK exists

Secret Key Capacity

For i.i.d. observations $\{(X^n, Y^n, Z^n)\}_{n=1}^{\infty}$, $C(X, Y|Z) := \lim_{\varepsilon, \delta \to 0} \liminf_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} S_{\varepsilon, \delta}(X^n, Y^n|Z^n)$

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Basic lower (achievability) bound:

$$C(X, Y|Z) \ge H(X|Z) - H(X|Y)$$

Basic upper (converse) bound:

$$C(X, Y|Z) \le I(X \land Y|Z)$$

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Theorem [Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93] When $X \multimap Y \multimap Z$ holds, $C(X,Y|Z) = I(X \land Y|Z)$ In particular, $C(X,Y) = I(X \land Y)$

Idea of achievability

• Information reconciliation


share a common random variable

• Privacy amplification

extract a secret key

Information Reconciliation

Use Slepian-Wolf coding:



If R > H(X|Y), there exists a code such that $\Pr\{X^n \neq \hat{X}^n\} \to 0$

Privacy Amplification

Alice and Bob shall generate secret key from X when Z is known to Eve.

Definition (2-Universal hash family)

A random function $F:\mathcal{X}\to \{0,1\}^l~~\text{is called 2-UHF}$ if

$$\mathbf{P}(F(x) = F(x')) \le \frac{1}{2^l}, \quad \forall x \neq x' \in \mathcal{X}$$

eg)

- the set of all functions from \mathcal{X} to $\{0,1\}^{l}$
- the set of all linear functions from \mathcal{X} to $\{0,1\}^l$

Privacy Amplification

Definition (Conditional min-entropy)

For P_{XZ} and Q_Z , the conditional min-entropy of P_{XZ} given Q_Z is

$$H_{\min}(P_{XZ}|Q_Z) := \min_{x \in \mathcal{X}, z \in \operatorname{supp}(Q_Z)} \log \frac{Q_Z(z)}{P_{XZ}(x, z)}$$

Then, the conditional min-entropy of P_{XZ} given Z is

$$H_{\min}(P_{XZ}|Z) := \max_{Q_Z} H_{\min}(P_{XZ}|Q_Z)$$

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The closed form (-log of success guessing probability):

$$H_{\min}(P_{XZ}|Z) = -\log \sum_{z} P_{Z}(z) \max_{x} P_{X|Z}(x|z)$$
$$Q_{Z}^{*}(z) \propto P_{Z}(z) \max_{x} P_{X|Z}(x|z)$$

Leftover Hash Lemma

The following bound is useful (cf. [Impagliazzo-Levin-Luby 89, Renner 05]).

Theorem (Leftover Hash Lemma)

For 2-UHF ${\cal F}\,$, ${\cal K}={\cal F}(X)$ satisfies

$$d(P_{KZF}, P_{\texttt{unif}} \times P_Z \times P_F) \le \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2^{l-H_{\min}(P_{XZ}|Z)}}$$

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 δ -secure secret key of length

$$H_{\min}(P_{XZ}|Z) - 2\log(1/2\delta)$$

can be generated.

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Typically, this bound is loose...; for i.i.d.,

$$\frac{1}{n}H_{\min}(P_{XZ}^{n}|Z^{n}) = H_{\min}(P_{XZ}|Z) < H(X|Z)$$

Smoothing

Smoothing:

 $P_{XZ} \to \tilde{P}_{XZ}$ under the condition $d(\tilde{P}_{XZ}, P_{XZ}) \leq \delta$

(allow sub-normalized distribution)

We allow sub-normalized distribution since we typically choose truncated distribution

$$\tilde{P}_{XZ}(x,z) = P_{XZ}(x,z)\mathbf{1}[(x,z) \in \mathcal{T}]$$

for some ${\mathcal T}$ with

$$P_{XZ}(\mathcal{T}) \ge 1 - 2\delta$$

Smooth Conditional Min-Entropy

Definition (Smooth conditional min-entropy)

For P_{XZ} and Q_Z , the smooth conditional min-entropy of P_{XZ} given Q_Z is

$$H_{\min}^{\delta}(P_{XZ}|Q_Z) := \max_{\tilde{P}_{XZ} \in \mathcal{B}_{\delta}(P_{XZ})} H_{\min}(\tilde{P}_{XZ}|Q_Z)$$

$$\mathcal{B}_{\delta}(P_{XZ}) := \{ \tilde{P}_{XZ} \in \mathcal{P}_{sub}(\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Z}) : d(\tilde{P}_{XZ}, P_{XZ}) \le \delta \}$$

Then, the smooth conditional min-entropy of P_{XZ} given Z is

$$H_{\min}^{\delta}(P_{XZ}|Z) := \max_{Q_Z} H_{\min}^{\delta}(P_{XZ}|Q_Z)$$

Leftover Hash Lemma with Smoothing

Apply triangular inequality for smoothed distribution...

Theorem (Leftover Hash Lemma with smoothing)

For 2-UHF ${\cal F}\,$, ${\cal K}={\cal F}(X)$ satisfies

$$d(P_{KZF}, P_{\texttt{unif}} \times P_Z \times P_F) \le 2\delta + \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{2^{l - H_{\min}^{\delta}(P_{XZ}|Z)}}$$

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$$H_{\min}^{(\delta-\eta)/2}(P_{XZ}|Z) - 2\log(1/2\eta) - 1$$

can be generated for $0 < \eta \leq \delta$.

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For i.i.d. observation,

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} H_{\min}^{(\delta - \eta)/2}(P_{XZ}^n | Z^n) = H(X|Z)$$

for $0 < \eta < \delta$.

Leftover Hash Lemma with Extra Message

The following variant of LHL for P_{XZV} is useful for later application:

Theorem (Leftover Hash Lemma with extra message)

For 2-UHF ${\cal F}\,$, ${\cal K}={\cal F}(X)$ satisfies

$$d(P_{KVZF}, P_{\text{unif}} \times P_{VZ} \times P_F) \le 2\delta + \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{|\mathcal{V}|}2^{l-H_{\min}^{\delta}(P_{XZ}|Z)}$$

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 δ -secure secret key of length

$$H_{\min}^{(\delta-\eta)/2}(P_{XZ}|Z) - 2\log(1/2\delta) - 1 - \log|\mathcal{V}|$$

for $0 < \eta \leq \varepsilon$; extra message reduces key length at most $\log |\mathcal{V}|$.

Composition of IR and PA

When message of rate $\,R\,$ is revealed to Eve in IR

Alice and Bob can generate SK at rate

H(X|Z) - R

 $\Longrightarrow H(X|Z) - H(X|Y)$ is attainable

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
 $\Longrightarrow H(X|Z) - H(X|Y)$ is attainable

More generally,

(Randomness unknown to Eve initially) — (Rate revealed in IR)

Idea of Converse: a property of interactive communication


Interactive communication



•

Idea of Converse: a property of interactive communication

Interactive communication



Lemma [Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93] For any protocol $\Pi = (\Pi_1, \dots, \Pi_r)$,

$$I(X \wedge Y | Z, \Pi) \le I(X \wedge Y | Z)$$

In particular,

$$P_{XYZ} = P_{X|Z}P_{Y|Z}P_{Z} \Longrightarrow P_{XYZ\Pi} = P_{X|Z\Pi}P_{Y|Z\Pi}P_{Z\Pi}$$

A Basic Converese Bound

By the Fano inequality argument,...

Theorem [Maurer 93, Ahlswede-Csiszár 93] For every $0 \le \varepsilon, \delta < 1$ with $\varepsilon + \delta < 1$, $S_{\varepsilon,\delta}(X, Y|Z) \le \frac{I(X \land Y|Z) + h(\varepsilon) + h(\delta)}{1 - \varepsilon - \delta}$

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By the Fano inequality argument,...

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$$S_{\varepsilon,\delta}(X,Y|Z) \le \frac{I(X \land Y|Z) + h(\varepsilon) + h(\delta)}{1 - \varepsilon - \delta}$$

For i.i.d. observations,

$$C(X, Y|Z) = \lim_{\varepsilon, \delta \to 0} \liminf_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} S_{\varepsilon, \delta}(X^n, Y^n|Z^n) \le I(X \land Y|Z)$$

It is tight when (X, Y, Z) form Markov chain (degraded):

$$I(X \wedge Y|Z) = H(X|Z) - H(X|Y)$$

Conditional Independence Testing Bound

By relating SK and hypothesis testing,...

Theorem [Tyagi-W. 14] For every $0 \le \varepsilon, \delta < 1$ and $0 < \eta < 1 - \varepsilon - \delta$, we have

$$S_{\varepsilon,\delta}(X,Y|Z) \leq -\log \beta_{\varepsilon+\delta+\eta}(P_{XYZ},Q_{XYZ}) + 2\log(1/\eta)$$

for any $Q_{XYZ} = Q_{X|Z}Q_{Y|Z}Q_{Z}$.

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strong converse can be proved.

It is also tight up to the second-order term for degraded case.

Second-Order Rate of Secret Key Agreement

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The standard protocol with

- information reconciliation
- privacy amplification

no interaction

achieves the secrecy capacity: $H(X|Z) - H(X|Y) = I(X \wedge Y|Z)$

The standard protocol is always optimal? Does interaction help in some case?

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Theorem [Hayashi-Tyagi-W. 14]

For
$$0<\varepsilon,\delta<1$$
 with $\varepsilon+\delta<1$,

$$S_{\varepsilon,\delta}(X^n, Y^n | Z^n) = nI(X \wedge Y | Z) - \sqrt{nV}Q^{-1}(\varepsilon + \delta) + \mathcal{O}(\log n)$$

where

$$V := \operatorname{Var}\left[\log \frac{P_{XY|Z}(X, Y|Z)}{P_{X|Z}(X|Z)P_{Y|Z}(Y|Z)}\right]$$

$$Q(a) := \int_{a}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{t^2}{2}\right) dt$$

• information reconciliation

• privacy amplification

• information reconciliation

$$nH(X|Y) + \sqrt{nV_{X|Y}}Q^{-1}(\varepsilon) + \mathcal{O}(\log n)$$
$$V_{X|Y} = \operatorname{Var}\left[\log\frac{1}{P_{X|Y}(X|Y)}\right]$$

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The standard protocol does not achieve the optimal second-order rate.

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The standard protocol does not achieve the optimal second-order rate.

The optimal second-order rate is achieved by an interactive protocol.

Use interactive Slepian-Wolf coding (cf. [Draper 04, Feder-Schulman 02, Yang-He 10])

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Basic ideas are...

• Alice should communicate at small rate if $h_{P_{X|Y}}(X|Y) = \log \frac{1}{P_{X|Y}(X|Y)}$ is small;

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
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- Bob return Ack/Nack until it decode X.

The usage of interaction decreases information revealed to Eve...

Multi-Party Secret Key Agreement

Multi-Party Setting

[Csiszár-Narayan 04]



 $X_A := (X_i : i \in A) \qquad \qquad K_{\mathcal{M}} := (K_1, \dots, K_m)$

Problem Formulation of Multi-Party SK

The generate key is
$$(arepsilon,\delta)$$
 -SK $(0\leqarepsilon,\delta<1)$ if there exists K such that

Reliability
$$\Pr\{K_1 = \cdots = K_m = K\} \ge 1 - \varepsilon$$

Security $d(P_{K\Pi Z}, P_{\texttt{unif}} \times P_{\Pi Z}) \leq \delta$

 $S_{\varepsilon,\delta}(X_{\mathcal{M}})$:maximum $\log |\mathcal{K}|$ such that a protocol generating (ε, δ) -SK exists

$$C(X_{\mathcal{M}}) := \lim_{\varepsilon, \delta \to 0} \liminf_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} S_{\varepsilon, \delta}(X_{\mathcal{M}}^n)$$

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it is asymmetric...

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it is asymmetric...

$$= H(X_1, X_2) - H(X_1|X_2) - H(X_2|X_1)$$

(Randomness unknown to Eve initially) — (Rate revealed in IR)

$$C(X_1, X_2) = I(X_1 \land X_2)$$

= $H(X_1) - H(X_1|X_2)$


it is asymmetric...

$$= H(X_1, X_2) - H(X_1|X_2) - H(X_2|X_1)$$

 $H(X_{\mathcal{M}})-$ communication rate needed to agree on $X_{\mathcal{M}}$

Omniscience (Data Exchange) Problem

[Csiszár-Narayan 04]



 $L_{\epsilon}(X_{\mathcal{M}})$: minimum sum-rate for omniscience with $P(X_{\mathcal{M}}^{(i)} = X_{\mathcal{M}}, \ \forall 1 \le i \le m) \ge 1 - \epsilon$

$$R(\mathbf{P}_{X_{\mathcal{M}}}) = \lim_{\epsilon \to 0} \limsup_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{n} L_{\epsilon}(X_{\mathcal{M}}^{n})$$

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$$R(\mathbf{P}_{X_{\mathcal{M}}}) = \min\left\{\sum_{i=1}^{m} R_i : \sum_{i \in B} R_i \ge H(X_B | X_{B^c}), \quad \forall B \subsetneq \mathcal{M}\right\}$$

[Csiszár-Narayan 04]

Achieved by Slepian-Wolf coding; interaction not needed.

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 $m = 3 \qquad \Sigma(\mathcal{M}) = \{\{1|23\}, \{12|3\}, \{23|1\}, \{1|2|3\}\}$ $R(P_{X_{\mathcal{M}}}) = \max\left\{H(X_1|X_2, X_3) + H(X_2, X_3|X_1), H(X_3|X_1, X_2) + H(X_1, X_2|X_3), \\H(X_2|X_1, X_3) + H(X_1, X_3|X_2), \frac{H(X_2, X_3|X_1) + H(X_1, X_3|X_2) + H(X_1, X_2|X_3)}{2}\right\}$

Multi-Party Secrecy Capacity

Theorem [Csiszár-Narayan 04]

$$C(X_{\mathcal{M}}) = H(X_{\mathcal{M}}) - R(P_{X_{\mathcal{M}}})$$

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A single-shot converse can be proved via hypothesis testing [Tyagi-W. 14]

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It suffices to construct a universal data exchange protocol.

In fact, it works for a given individual sequence...

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Theorem [Tyagi-W. 16]
```

There exists a universal data exchange protocol such that, for a given $\mathbf{X}_{\mathcal{M}}$, it communicates

```
nR^*(\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{x}_{\mathcal{M}}}) + \mathcal{O}(\sqrt{n})
```

where $P_{\mathbf{x}_{\mathcal{M}}}$ is the joint type.

The universal protocol is called recursive data exchange (RDE) protocol.

Universal RDE Protocol

Two-step coding for single-terminal source coding:

- (1) Send the type $\mathcal{O}(\log n)$
- (2) Send the index among the type class $nH(\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{x}}) + \mathcal{O}(\log n)$

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The decoder looks for joint type $P_{\overline{XY}}$ s.t. there exists a unique $\hat{\mathbf{X}}$ satisfying

1)
$$P_{\hat{\mathbf{x}}\mathbf{y}} = P_{\overline{XY}}$$

2) $R_t \ge H(\overline{X}|\overline{Y}) + \Delta$

3) Hash values (bin indices) of $\hat{\mathbf{X}}$ up to round t are compatible.

Decoding Rule for Local Omniscience

Local omniscience region for $A \subseteq \mathcal{M}$:

$$\mathcal{R}^{\Delta}_{\mathsf{CO}}(A|\mathcal{P}_{\overline{X}_{A}}) = \left\{ (R_{i}: i \in A) : \sum_{i \in B} R_{i} \ge H(\overline{X}_{B}|\overline{X}_{A \setminus B}) + |B|\Delta, \ \forall B \subseteq A \right\}$$

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i th party looks for maximal $i \in A \subseteq M$ and $P_{\overline{X}_A}$ s.t. there exists a unique $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_A$ satisfying

1) $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_i = \mathbf{x}_i$, $P_{\hat{\mathbf{x}}_A} = P_{\overline{X}_A}$ 2) $(R_i^{(t)} : i \in A) \in \mathcal{R}^{\Delta}_{CO}(A|P_{\overline{X}_A})$

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
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
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Once accumulated rate vector enters a local omniscience region, local omniscience occur automatically. Difficulty is how to increment rates...


Two-party case:




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


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
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
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Rate assignment for the tipping

$$\sum_{i \in A \setminus \{j\}} R_i^*(A) = H(\overline{X}_A | \overline{X}_j), \ j \in A$$

Property:

$$R_i^*(A) - R_j^*(A) = H(\overline{X}_i) - H(\overline{X}_j)$$

Theorem (rough statement)

At some point,
$$(R_i^{(t)}: i \in A)$$
 for some $A \subseteq \mathcal{M}$ reaches $\mathcal{R}^{\Delta}_{CO}(A|\mathcal{P}_{\overline{X}_A})$ at

 $(R_i^*(A):i\in A)$ modulo $\mathcal{O}(\Delta)$

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From that point, the parties in A behaves as if one large party: increment rule is

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
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
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
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
Theorem (rough statement)

The protocol proceed as if A were one party from the begin with...










Performance of Universal RDE

Corollary (rough statement)

The protocol recursively attain omniscience with rate



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- Even the first-order capacity is not known in general.
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(3) Universal protocol for the case with helpers

- When only subset $\mathcal{A} \subset \mathcal{M}$ try to attain omniscience, is there universal protocol?
- Slepian-Wolf coding is known to be optimal, but the rate formula is more involved.

Thank you for listening.